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Raposa: Religious Metaphor

M I C H A E L L. R A P O S A

Religious

Metaphor

Contemporary theory of metaphor has supplied some extraordinary resources for unraveling the logic and determining the
significance of particular types of religious utterances. Like poetry,
religious discourse often seems to draw its life-blood from metaphor.
Even the theologian is occasionally compelled, by the exigencies of
his or her task, to abandon literal speech in favor of the metaphorical
mode. Given the contemporary emphasis on the cognitive utility of
metaphor, such a move may now be regarded- as the pursuit of a
positive option rather than a desperate maneuver or last resort.
The scholarly impact of Max Black's famous essay on "Metaphor"1
is largely responsible for the renewed interest in this topic. In the
second half of his essay, Black articulates and defends the "interaction view" of metaphor, citing as one of the primary sources of this
modern theory the work of I. A. Richards. 2 In his own version of the
interaction view, Black identifies two subjects in every metaphorical
utterance; for example, in "the world is a stage," "world" is the
principal and "stage" the subsidiary subject. Such utterances convey
their meaning by causing the principal subject to be seen in terms of
or "through" the subsidiary subject. In its literal usage the "M-word"
(the metaphorical term or expression, in this case "stage") implies a
"system of associated commonplaces" (a pattern of implied meanings,
images, and feelings) that, when the word is used metaphorically,
functions as a special kind of "lens" for viewing the principal subject.
Commenting on his own example ("Man is a wolf"), Black explains
that

A suitable hearer will be led by the wolf-system of
implications to construct a corresponding system of
implications about the principal subject. But these
implications will not be those comprised in the
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commonplaces normally implied by literal uses of
"man." The new implications must be determined
by the pattern of implications associated with literal
uses of the word "wolf." Any human traits that can
without undue strain be talked about in "wolflanguage" will be rendered prominent, and any that
cannot will be pushed into the background. The
wolf-metaphor suppresses some details, emphasizes
others — in short, organizes our view of man. 3

Earlier in the essay, Black had distinguished between the "focus"
and the "frame" of a metaphor, the former being the metaphorical
expression itself and the latter its sentential context. Now he argues
that the focal word receives from its frame a new, extended meaning.
"Wolf" in its literal usage is not identical with "wolf in a metaphorical
context. Consequently, this metaphorical "interaction" results both
in a special perspective on the principal subject (because it is viewed in
terms of the subsidiary subject) and in a new meaning for the focal
word (relative to its non-metaphorical usage).
Black's analysis suggests several ways in which metaphors might
be seen to function. They might operate as instructions to see some
actual thing as something else; that is, they could work to organize
one's perception and comprehension of specific objects or phenomena.
Black describes this function in detail, and it is directly analogous to
what Wittgenstein calls "seeing an aspect" of something.4 In addition,
metaphors may operate to allow one to imagine possible objects and
phenomena. This could happen in two ways:
1) The object of a metaphor could itself be possible rather
than actual, in the sense that it could be fictional or general in
character. Poems, novels, and plays are filled with metaphorical
descriptions of non-actual objects, persons, and events, as are our
discussions of such works of art. "War is hell" depicts not some
specific, historical instance of war, but war in general (all possible as
well as all actual wars).
2) The "interaction" between metaphor and object might
alter one's perception of the object in such a way that it could no
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longer be considered to actually exist as perceived; the metaphor
would reveal (or allow one to entertain or contemplate) not some
aspect of what a thing is, but rather features of how an actual thing
might possibly be. (This might explain what Black is suggesting when
he asserts that metaphors are not based upon but "create"similarities.5)
Here the possible is rooted in the actual. The metaphor resembles
what its object might be, exposes features that its object could
possess, or would possess given certain circumstances. Such mightbe's, would-be's, and could-be's are part of the language of the
imagination, the grammar of possibility. To assert, for example, that
"all men are brothers" is to say, metaphorically, as much about what
is possible for mankind as about what actually holds true in the
present state of affairs.
Metaphors, then, may reveal both the actual and the possible
aspects of things. They do so by establishing a perspective from which
to consider their objects. Such a perspective will be useful and
illuminating in certain ways and to a certain extent. Nevertheless,
even a metaphor that seems to capture the "essence" of its object will
fail to reveal that object in all of its aspects. Every perspective is finite;
new metaphors are constantly being formulated and employed. Often
one is being instructed by the metaphor to imagine the possibilities
that are latent in things, or the way that things might exist in altered
states of affairs. Such possibilities can be purely fanciful or "makebelieve" and never actualized; on the other hand, this kind of
revelation, as well as the type of metaphor that mediates it, can be and
very often is extremely valuable. The metaphorical insight can
constitute a genuine cognitive advance; imagined possibilities can
shape and transform human action.
There is another way in which the imagination is involved in
one's interpretion of and response to metaphors. Black notes that
when a word is used metaphorically not only is a new perspective
provided concerning the principal subject, but the meaning of the
metaphorical focus is itself altered. Clearly, there is a sense in which
the relationship between the metaphorical and the literal usages of a
word will be asymmetrical; 6 certain normal "presuppositions"
concerning the nature of a given thing will be "cancelled" when the
word for that thing is used in a metaphorical context. For example,
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compare "the ox is-grazing" with "John is an ox." In the latter
metaphorical context, the presupposition that "ox" is a label for a
specific, non-human quadruped is excluded, even though many of the
features and characteristics (bigness, clumsiness) that are implied by
such a presupposition continue to be implied in the non-literal
context. Consequently, a metaphorical expression can evoke an
imaginative response with respect both to the object being depicted
and to the metaphorical term itself. In the metaphorical "event," our
concepts of "ox," "wolf," and "stage," as well as of "John," "man,"
and "the world" are imaginatively'transfigured.
Given this kind of analysis of metaphors and of the role that the
imagination plays in the formulation and interpretation of such
expressions, how can the discussion now be focused on the problem
of specifically religious verbal behavior? It might first be suggested
that the special problem of religious metaphor may not be quite as
"special" as one would automatically tend to assume. Much of what
needs to be said about the religious use of metaphors will be implied
directly or indirectly in any general discussion of metaphor. The task
is to draw out those implications and expand upon them.
Black emphasizes the cognitive utility of metaphorical usage. In
this respect, his analysis has clear implications for any theory of
religious discourse. If whenever one wished to illuminate a religious
phenomenon or describe it in a different fashion, it became necessary
to "invent** new predicates, then half of one's time would be absorbed
by such a task. The other half would be spent explaining the meaning
of the new predicates to those with whom one wished to communicate.
Fortunately, languages have their own creative resources. Words and
expressions can be "borrowed" from specific verbal environments
and placed in new contexts with amazing effectiveness. Religion is
obviously not the only beneficiary here. The use of metaphors (as well
as other types of "models") to describe natural phenomena is a
strategy often discussed and debated by philosophers of science.7 The
scientific examples are similar to what occurs when metaphors are
used as models to illuminate the religious experience or the objects of
religious belief.8 Black's description of this general function of
metaphor applies quite accurately to particular religious usages:
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. . . there are powerful and irreplaceable uses of
metaphor not adequately described by the old
formula of "saying one thing and meaning another."
A memorable metaphor has the power to bring
two separate domains into cognitive and emotional
relation by using language directly appropriate to
one as a lens for seeing the other; the implications,
suggestions, and supporting values entwined with
the literal use of the metaphorical expression enable
us to see a subject matter in a new way. The
extended meanings that result, the relation between
initially disparate realms created, can neither be
antecedently predicted nor subsequently paraphrased
in prose. We can comment upon the metaphor, but
the metaphor itself neither needs nor invites
explanation or paraphrase. Metaphorical thought
is a distinctive mode of achieving insight, not to be
construed as an ornamental substitute for plain
thought. 9

Black's emphasis on the unique and unsubstitutable nature of
metaphorical occurrences is especially important. The claim that
religion uses metaphors to express truths that cannot be expressed
literally (a claim often enough made by both philosophers and
religious believers) is not a special claim about religious language. It
is the case with all interaction metaphors (Black does allow that
certain "trivial" metaphors do not fall under this category) that they
are not subject to literal paraphrase.
Arguments for the cognitive economy and utility of religious
metaphors prevent any simplified understanding of such occurrences
as being merely "ornamental" or pleasurable. Nonetheless, this is not
to deny that good-metaphors are colorful, evocative, pleasing, and
sometimes produce a powerful emotional effect. In a recent discussion
of religious language, James F. Ross observes that such language is
"craftbound" and, therefore, that "it functions to motivate and often
to modulate human behavior in pursuit of characteristic, craftidentifying objectives."10 This type of "motivation" or "modulation"
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requires a language that is both meaningful and evocative (i.e.,
"inspirational"). Metaphorical expressions often seem to fit the bill.
Saying that "God is our loving father" not only tells something about
the deity, but also evokes a certain kind of emotional response that
may be lacking when one is told that "God is the supreme being" or
"God is the first, uncaused cause." Of course the metaphorical focus
— "loving father" — acquires a new meaning within this frame. Not
all of the conventional presuppositions about fathers will be applicable
here; God is no ordinary "father," nor is God's love an ordinary love.
Nelson Goodman's observation that effective metaphors always
"startle" 11 bears an analogy to certain notions prevalent in contemporary biblical scholarship concerning one of the special functions
of the gospel parables. Many of the parables, like certain metaphorical
occurrences, are designed to produce a startling, disorienting effect
upon the listener or reader. One is forced to recast old ways of
thinking and believing into the contexts created by new images and
new sets of categories. (These categories are often "borrowed" from
the accounts of ordinary human events and experiences.) It would
seem reasonable, then, to argue that many of the parables serve a
definite metaphorical function, that they are, in a sense, extended
metaphors.
The comprehension of both parables and metaphors is certainly
a cognitive exercise, but clearly it often engages the whole person.
Generally speaking, the sense of an unambiguous, literal assertion
can be quickly grasped and then "tucked away" for future reference.
The chances that the task of "processing" such an assertion will
require total engagement are relatively slim. If religion is a phenomenon that ideally involves "whole" persons and personalities,
however, the users of religious language will tend to find metaphorical
expressions particularly helpful. Good metaphors can never be
cognitively "processed" (or paraphrased) in the same way that literal
statements often are. "Cognitive playing" might provide a more
appropriate model for what takes place here: the testing or "trying
out" of contrasts and associations, the "playing" with the various
ideas, meanings, images, and feelings that metaphors express and
evoke.12 The pleasure that is generally associated with all kinds of
playful activity might account for the pleasing effect of many
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metaphors. In any event, a good deal has been written and said about
the play-element in religious ritual and behavior, but there has been
relatively little discussion concerning the potentially religious
significance of this activity of cognitive play. The American philosopher Charles Peirce is an exception here, arguing that "abductive"
or hypothetical reasoning, under certain circumstances, can take the
form of "Pure Play" or "Musement." 13 This sort of cognitive play,
Peirce suggested, will inevitably tend, if unrestricted, to result in the
contemplation of the God-hypothesis; Musement becomes a type of
religious meditation. Interestingly enough, Peirce's analysis of "abduction" resonates with Black's discussion of metaphorical thinking;
it involves the formulation and exploration of hypotheses,
the identification of objects and phenomena as being certain "sorts"
of things. It should be noted that a hypothesis can have considerable
explanatory power regardless of its truth-value. A given metaphor,
regarded as a "hypothesis" that one can entertairi even though it is
actually or literally false, can function as a source of insight precisely
because it involves the contemplation of a particular thing in terms of
or with respect to a specific class or "rule." Peirce's analysis of such
rules as "habits of thought "anticipates the contemporary psychological
investigation of perceptual and conceptual'"sets." 14 One's habitual
way of thinking about a certain type of thing organizes one's
perception of anything that is classified ("correctly" or not) as being
of that type (e.g., the classification of "the world" as a "stage").
Whatever the "metaphorical truth" of an utterance, if it is a
genuine case of metaphor it is clearly also not true in a literal sense.
This negative aspect of metaphor has been carefully analyzed by
Colin Turbayne, who portrays metaphors as a type of intentional
"category mistake."15 Here the emphasis is on the duplicity of
metaphor, on its character as a pretense. Men are not literally wolves;
one is being asked to regard them as if'they were wolves. Consequently,
there is a certain risk as well as an advantage involved in the
employment of a metaphor. Turbayne describes this risk as the
potential confusion of the "mask" with the "face," the danger of
treating metaphorical expressions as if they were literal utterances.
Taken (i.e., "mis-taken") literally, metaphors cease to function as
sources of insight, but rather they blind and they limit us; they lose
their cognitive utility and we instead are "used" by them.
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The startling effect of many religious parables and metaphors is
the result of this negative factor. Such an effect, when achieved, may
function as a preparation for grasping some deeper religious insight.
That is to say, perceiving the obvious literal falsity of the metaphorical
utterance may pave the way for comprehending a more profound,
"metaphorical truth." Disorientation precedes reorientation; the
negative effect of metaphor is essential.
It may also be the case, however, that this negative function is
preeminent. In such instances, religious metaphor serves the same
purpose as some religious paradoxes; it is not a positive description of
the religious object that is intended, but rather a forceful demonstration
of the inappropriateness of all such descriptions. Consequently, one
should be cautious about inferring the meanings of specific religious
metaphors. The actual meaning, in a given case, may be that all
inferred "meanings" are misleading or inadequate.
Turbayne's project of exposing "hidden" metaphors resonates
with certain strands of contemporary theological reflection. Rudolph
Bultmann's understanding of the task of "demythologization"and
Paul Tillich's vigorous attack on "literalism" represent attempts to
sensitize believers to the symbolic complexities of religious utterances.
More recently, feminist theologians have sought to "expose" the
masculine metaphors that dominate western religious discourse. The
resistance to such projects, both lively and widespread, indicates the
striking relevance of Turbayne's analysis to the religious realm. The
confusion between "mask" and "face" in the case of some religious
metaphors may have occurred over a long or a short period of time,
but once entrenched in the religious consciousness it becomes
extremely difficult to dislodge. The power of metaphor to illuminate
is matched by the power of hidden metaphor to blind and to limit
one's vision. Of course, certain approaches to "demythologization"
or to the "exposure" of hidden metaphors may be based on faulty
theoretical premises, and may be conducted with little sensitivity to
the real meaning of specific religious utterances. The confusion
between the "literal" and the "metaphorical" can cut both ways. For
an utterance to be metaphorical, it must be framed or intended as
such; for it to be a "hidden" metaphor it must have been originally
regarded as metaphorical. It is hardly enlightening to designate as
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"metaphors" all utterances that one regards as false. It is more honest
simply to refute them.
Despite the fact that metaphorical expressions often appear in
the form of truth-claims and not as comparisons, the relationship
between similes and metaphors is quite complex. Even Black, who
denies that metaphor is simply a case of "condensed or elliptical
simile," is willing to admit this. There is clearly a sense in which
comparison might be said to constitute a "moment" in the interpretation of metaphorical expressions. Understanding a metaphor
may involve much more than this act of comparison, but it does not
preclude comparison as a part of the complete process of understanding. In the case of similes then, it is unreasonable to assert that
they never function analogously to metaphors. Here it is useful to
turn again to the examples provided by the New Testament. At
various points in the gospel narratives one reads that "the Kingdom
of Heaven is like X."The purpose of such similes is to teach the reader
or listener something about the Kingdom, as well as to evoke a
particular kind of response. X provides a perspective on the
Kingdom; knowledge of X shapes and informs the reader's perception
of a reality that is not directly accessible to the senses. Here
Wittgenstein is right on target;16 the description of the negative
function of metaphor is paralleled in his discussion of the imagination
by the observation that, in imagining something, one does not listen
or look about, but concentrates inwardly, closes one's eyes and
blocks one's ears in an attempt to suspend or "negate" actual sense
perception and its distractions. The best evidence that these biblical
"similes" function metaphorically rather than as simple comparisons
is that the "Kingdom of Heaven" is not available for inspection, and
therefore not directly available for or accessible to an act of
comparison. One is being told to perform an imaginative act in this
case. Something may already be known about the Kingdom, but this
knowledge is now being imaginatively reshaped and reorganized,
new possibilities evoked. Here one encounters as clear a case of
"seeing as" as any explicit metaphor would provide.
Of course, religious discourse manifests a wide variety of explicit
metaphors: "God is love,""The Lord is my shepherd,""I am the light
of the world," "Brahman is both near and far," and so on.
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Furthermore, it is not being suggested that all or even most of
religious language is figurative or metaphorical. Nonetheless, the
religious impulse remains rooted in the possible, particularly in the
eschatological possibility of the not-yet-but-hoped-for. Such possibilities can only be apprehended imaginatively; consequently, the
religious imagination will inevitably find for itself a language
congenial to its own special purposes, a language enriched and
extended by metaphors.
y
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